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Abstract. The EU is currently modernizing customs legislation and practices. 
Main pillars in the new vision are an intensive use of IT (Customs becomes e-
Customs), partnerships between Customs administrations and businesses 
(G2B), and collaboration between national Customs administrations (G2G). But 
how to design new customs control procedures? Very little theory exists, and an 
inspection of current procedures shows that they are vulnerable to fraud, and 
thus badly designed. Therefore we identify a need for developing theory for the 
design of government control procedures. Some research has been done on 
designing inter-organizational controls in B2B transactions. In this paper we 
argue that with certain modifications control principles used in B2B are also 
suitable for the Government-to-Business context, and we present a conceptual 
model for designing government controls in G2B, based on earlier work of 
Bons. We use a study on customs procedures for the export of agricultural 
goods from the EU to Russia as a proof of concept. 
Keywords: e-Customs, e-Government, G2B, design methodology, conceptual 
modeling, procedure redesign. 
1   Introduction 
Globalization, growing trade volumes and an increased threat of terrorism are main 
drivers behind the understanding that new customs procedures and legislation are 
required. National governments and the World Customs Organization (WCO) 
recognize this reality and set a new vision for modern customs, including a shift in 
roles, responsibilities and underlying assumptions. Within this shift, the EU is 
currently reshaping its customs legislation and practices. Main pillars in the new 
vision are intensive use of IT (Customs becomes e-Customs), partnerships between 
customs administrations and businesses, and collaboration between national customs 
administrations. These concepts help cope with the dilemma of on the one hand 
increasing security, safety, financial and health requirements, and on the other hand a 
need to reduce administrative burden, to keep the EU a competitive economic zone. 
While a lot of focus is put on the strategic vision behind new customs procedures, 
it is important to bear in mind the operational goals of customs control, which must be 
achieved by new customs procedures. To this end, existing theory on controls should 
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be applied when designing new customs controls. This is currently not being done: we 
investigated two European customs control procedures and found that they do not 
adhere to basic control principles, and hence they fail to achieve their control goals 
[13, 14]. Control in a government context is more than a safeguard of monetary value; 
it aims to protect the public interest, including security, health and political stability. 
Therefore we identify the need to establish sound theory to support domain experts in 
designing government controls. The theory should formulate principles for the design 
of government control, and a systematic, methodological application of these 
principles. Ideally, the theory should be supported by decision support software tools. 
A pre-requisite for building such tools is that theory is described (semi)formally in 
conceptual models. 
Customs controls are governmental controls that apply to international supply 
chains, and hence to inter-organizational settings. While a wealth of research exists on 
internal control [e.g., 16, 18], only limited academic work on inter-organizational 
control (IOC) is available. In particular, Bons et al. argue that the same principles 
used for internal control can be used also for inter-organizational control [5, 6, 7]. Our 
earlier work [13, 14] supports this claim and presents first steps in a theory for 
designing and analyzing government controls. 
In the current paper we continue these efforts and we present a number of 
contributions to existing knowledge. First, we develop control principles for G2B 
(Government-to-Business) and argue that they are a variation of B2B (Business-to-
Business) control principles. Second, we develop a conceptual model that captures 
G2B control principles. This conceptual model can be used as a basis for systematic 
software-aided design and analysis of government control procedures. Finally, we 
exemplify the use of this theoretical framework in a case study concerning the export 
of agricultural goods from the EU to Russia. 
2   Development of Organizational Control Theory 
2.1   From Internal to Inter-organizational Control 
Research on organizational control stems from the field of internal control. The focus 
of internal control is limited by a single-company paradigm, where companies 
operated mostly as independent units. In 1992, COSO (The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission) issued the Framework of Internal 
Control, which has been used by thousands of corporations to conduct their internal 
control. COSO defines internal control as “a process, affected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives in : Effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations; Reliability of financial reporting and Compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations” [9]. 
In recent years, collaborations among organizations have increased dramatically. The 
focus shifted from research on a single company to research on business 
networks/business webs [20] or value constellations [15], and inter-organizational 
relations have gained their place in the academic world. Hence, also the notion of 
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control has been extended to an inter-organization context: “Inter-organizational 
controls are those measures that limit the risk a party runs in a business transaction due 
to the possible existence of opportunistic behavior by its trading partners” [5, p. 36]. 
Research on inter-organizational control (IOC) is still in its infancy and limited to 
business settings where all parties pursue commercial benefits. It is a pending issue to 
further develop the theory for relations between government and businesses (G2B).  
2.2   Bons’ Inter-organizational Control Principles 
An important contribution to IOC research is Bons’ five fundamental IOC principles 
for B2B control [7]: 
1. “If a primary activity is performed by Role 1, Role 2 should testify the 
completion thereof using some document, which should be received by Role 1. 
If the party playing Role 2 is not trusted by the party playing Role 1, the 
primary activity should be executed after receiving the document.  
2. Before Role 1 executes a primary activity it should have witnessed the 
performance of the counter-activity by some Role 2 if the party playing Role 1 
does not trust the party responsible for role 2, unless it has received evidence 
that Role 2 has executed its tasks. 
3. If Role 1 cannot witness the performance of a counter activity, another Role 3 
should testify the completion of Role 2’s activity if the party playing Role 2 is 
not trusted by the party playing Role 1. This document must be received by 
Role 1 before the execution of its primary activity, and the party playing Role 
3 should be trusted by the party playing Role 1. 
4. If a primary activity is outsourced to an agent and the principal role did not 
previously witness the counter-performance or receive evidence thereof, the 
agent role should witness this counter-performance before it performs the 
(outsourced) primary activity if the principal does not trust his counterparty. If 
this is not possible, the agent role should at least receive evidence of the 
counter-performance. 
5. If the counter-activity (by Role 2) to some primary activity of Role 1 consists 
of only the enabling actions of Role 2 to arrange some agent (Role 3), and not 
the agent’s performance as well, and the party that plays Role 1 does not trust 
the party that plays Role 2 and has not previously witnessed the counter-
activity, Role 1 should receive an unambiguous promise from Role 3 that it 
will be the beneficiary of Role 3’s performance before it executes his own 
primary activity. Furthermore, the party playing Role 1 should trust the party 
that plays Role 3”. 
Some important terminology has to be explained here. A primary activity is a 
“primary obligation in some underlying legal agreement” [5]. Based on the principle of 
economic reciprocity, a primary activity of one actor is the counter activity of another 
actor. The typical case is a delivery of goods and a payment. The delivery of goods is the 
primary activity of the supplier, but it is a counter activity from the buyer’s perspective. 
These principles assume independent and non-hierarchical relationships between 
organizations and pay special attention to outsourcing activities and to the reciprocal 
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character of contracts. Bons also investigates the ‘trust” relationship amongorganizations. 
Trust is defined by [17] as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. 
However, “trust” is difficult to quantify and has numerous interpretations [19]. 
Considering “trust” as control factor creates barriers for understanding and applying 
controls and for designing IS support. To overcome this difficulty, we assume that no 
trust pre-exists under B2B context, unless there exists legal/contractual constraint or 
other enhancement like certification.  
2.3   From B2B to G2B Control 
Only limited research (e.g., [5, 10]) exists on IOC, and existing research is focused 
on B2B relationships. A question raised here is whether control principles for B2B 
can be applied in the G2B context. An extensive literature review [5-10, 16, 18, 21 
and more] shows that the intrinsic components of control do not differ between 
business and government control. Under both settings, control is affected by the 
interplays among three essential components: actor, activity and documents (for 
details, refer to [14]). We therefore argue that Bons’ control principles for B2B 
apply also to G2B, when following differences between B2B and G2B are taken 
into consideration:  
• Bons’ principles are bi-directional because no trust is assumed between any two 
parties. We assume the government to be trusted (we consider modern 
democracies; in other regimes and cultures this assumption may not always be 
valid). Thus Bons’ principles can be applied only when role 1 is the government, 
and role 2 is a business. 
• Therefore, the primary activity, in Bons’ terms, is the government (control) 
activity. Similarly, the counter activity is a business transaction that the 
government (primary) activity controls. 
• Yet, businesses could win the government trust by means of certifications [1, 4]. 
• Control under B2B normally focuses on safeguarding financial profits, however, 
government is not profit pursuing in most cases. In the G2B context, controls not 
related with economic (monetary) value are also considered important (e.g., legal 
compliance, security and social welfare). 
An important application of G2B control is Customs control. The WCO (World 
Customs Organization) argues that good Customs control should rely on public-
private partnerships and collaboration between government organizations [21]. In 
Section 4 we present a case study about this issue. 
3   A Conceptual Model of G2B Control Principles 
The principles of Bons et al. presented in section 2.2 provide a natural language 
description of a theory, but they are not suitable for automation. Furthermore, they are 
not specific for government control. Therefore we (1) transformed Bons’ B2B control 
principle to G2B control (see Tables 1, 2 and 3), and (2) developed a conceptual 
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model to capture this knowledge (see Figure 1). As software can reason only about 
formalized domains, creating conceptual models of a domain (in our case: control, see 
Figure 1) is a pre-requisite for developing supporting software tools. Software tools 
will support human experts in designing government controls. They support human 
experts in investigating whether the current control procedures are well-designed and 
how to redesign a satisfactory government control (this is shown in section 4). It is 
not our intention to develop a software tool that would automate whole government 
controls, but rather to develop a tool that would help human experts reason about the 
design of these controls. 
We map Bons’ B2B terminology to G2B terminology in Table 1. Most concepts 
in Table 1 are assumed to be self-explanatory. The term TTP, Trusted Third Party, 
requires explanation. TTP is an entity which facilitates interactions between two 
parties who both trust it and is perceived  as a widely accepted, reliable, 
independent, and highly secure entity that generates trust through attestation or 
certification [1]. 
Table 1. Bons’ terminology transformed to G2B control terminology 
Bons’ terminology G2B control  terminology 
Role 1 Government actor 
Role 2 Business actor 
Role 3 TTP 
Primary activity Government (control) activity 
Counter activity Business activity 
 
Fig. 1. A Conceptual model for G2B control principles. For details about the UML Class Diagram 
notation see [11]. 
 Towards a Methodology for Designing E-Government Control Procedures 61 
Based on the earlier identified differences between B2B and G2B we explain in 
Table 2 how Bons’ B2B control principles change in the G2B context.  
Table 2. How Bons’ principles change in a G2B setting 
Principle number G2B vs. Bons et al [7] 
1 A control activity cannot take place before the business activity.  
The business actor is assumed to trust the government actor and 
need not testify the completion of a control activity.  Therefore 
principle 1 does not apply in G2B. 
2, 3 The government actor is assumed not to trust the business actor. 
The principles do not change. 
4 Here the government actor outsources its activity. This is only 
possible if the third party is trusted (hence the term TTP: Trusted 
Third Party). Trust is typically achieved by means of certification 
[1]. Also, government actors typically trust each other, and hence 
the TTP may be another government actor. 
5 Here the business actor outsources its activity to a TTP.  
The government actor is assumed not to trust the business actor. 
 
This results in G2B control principles, listed in Table 3 and formalized in Figure 1.  
 
Table 3.  Government control principles for G2B 
Bons’ principle 
number 
G2B control principle 
1 Does not apply in G2B 
2 Before a government actor executes a government activity it should 
have witnessed the performance of the business activity by some 
business actor, unless it has received evidence that the business actor 
has executed its tasks. 
3 If a government actor cannot witness the performance of a business 
activity, another TTP should testify the completion of the business 
actor’s activity. This document must be received by the government 
actor before the execution of its government activity. 
4 If a government activity is outsourced to a TTP and the government 
actor did not previously witness the business performance or receive 
evidence thereof, the TTP should witness this business performance 
before it performs the (outsourced) government activity. If this is not 
possible, the TTP should at least receive evidence of the business 
performance. 
5 If the business activity (by a business actor) to some government 
activity of a government actor consists of only the enabling actions of 
the business activity to arrange some TTP, and not the TTP’s 
performance as well, and the government actor has not previously 
witnessed the business activity, the government actor should receive 
an unambiguous promise from the TTP that it will be the beneficiary 
of the TTP’s performance before it executes his own government 
activity.  
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4   Case Study: Export from the EU to Russia 
A conceptual model as in Figure 1 serves for developing decision support tools for 
human experts. Tools implement business rules (in our case: G2B control 
principles) and support humans in designing control procedures. In the rest of this 
section we describe how we applied the conceptual model in Figure 1 in a real-
world situation to investigate whether existing G2B control procedures adhere to 
design principles.  
4.1   Case Description 
The case studied in this paper focuses on the export/import of agricultural goods from 
EU to Russia. When an EU company exports agricultural goods to a Russian 
company, two main regulations are involved: (1) The Russian buyer has to pay import 
duties in Russia; and (2) The EU seller applies for EU subsidies from EAGGF (the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund). Subsidies are given to EU 
companies that export agricultural goods outside the EU as a means to increase the 
competitiveness of the European agriculture. Russian import tax is levied based on the 
value of the imported goods, while EU subsidies are given based on goods quantity. 
Following main actors are involved in this scenario: (1) seller: an EU company; (2) 
buyer: a Russian company; (3) EU customs at the border (e.g., the Finnish customs at 
the border between Finland and Russia); (4) Russian customs; and (5) EAGGF, 
providing subsidies. Figure 2 shows the relevant procedures; it is based on the UML 
Activity Diagram notation, where every column (a “swimlane”) reflects the activities 
(rounded rectangles) of an actor, and where the arrows denote a sequence in activities. 
For brevity, the figure only shows the main activities. 
 
Fig. 2. Activity Diagram of the export process from Finland to Russia, focusing on EAGGF 
subsidies for agricultural goods 
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4.2   G2B Control Principles Used for Procedure Design 
The conceptual model presented in Section 3 provides guidelines for designing control 
mechanisms to safeguard the payment of import tax in Russia and the distribution of 
EAGGF subsidies. Since we do not have a software tool yet, in order to test the model’s 
computational validity, we simulate the algorithms of such a tool, and investigate the 
results in this section and in the next one. According to the G2B control principles, the 
import tax control procedure involves the following actors and activities:  
• Government actor: Russian customs. Government activity: enforce tax 
legislation (and in particular: collect import duties). 
• Business actor: a Russian buyer. Business activity: import goods. 
The Russian customs does not trust the Russian buyer, and therefore requires customs 
control procedures (these are currently not available, as can be seen in Figure 2). This 
is the underlying assumption of our principles. Theoretically, an importing company 
could not declare any import (and thus not pay import duties), or declare a lower 
value of the imported goods (and thus pay less duties).  
Although theoretically the Russian customs can physically inspect every shipment 
at the border, the lack of human resources does not allow such controls. Thus, 
principle 2 does not apply here because in reality the beneficiary of the business 
activity (i.e., Russian customs) cannot witness the buyer’s performance. And indeed, 
in reality a practice of double invoicing exists. Importing companies present the real 
invoice to the Finnish customs, and a fake invoice – with a lower value of goods – to 
the Russian customs, so that they pay less import duties. According to principle 3, a 
third party, trusted by the Russian customs, needs to be introduced, that would testify 
about the imported goods.  
In the interaction between EAGGF and the exporting EU companies we consider 
the following roles and activities: 
• Government actor: EAGGF. Government activity: support European 
agriculture (and in particular: provide subsidies). 
• Business actor: an EU seller. Business activity: export agricultural goods. 
EAGGF does not trust a company that claims it has exported agricultural goods 
outside the EU. As EAGGF is not part of the business transaction between sellers and 
buyers, it has no reliable information concerning the exported goods (quantity, value). 
Theoretically, an exporting company could declare an export that has never taken 
place, or declare having exported more goods than it actually has (and thus obtain 
more subsidies than it is entitled to). Principle 2 does not apply here because the 
beneficiary of the counter activity (i.e., EAGGF) cannot witness the seller’s 
performance. According to principle 3, a third role needs to be introduced, that would 
testify about the exported goods. This role must be trusted by EAGGF. 
5   Designing E-Customs Control Procedures 
According to principle 3, both control problems discussed above require the 
introduction of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that can provide evidence of the counter 
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actor’s performance. Double invoicing is a main problem for the Russian customs, 
resulting in loss of revenues. The difficulty in solving this control problem lies in the 
question which actor can serve as a trusted third party, with the capability to provide 
evidence of export from the EU to Russia.  
In G2B there are mostly two types of TTPs. Either one government actor serves as 
a TTP for another (e.g., Finnish customs can serve as a TTP for the Russian customs; 
customs can serve as a TPP for health agencies), or a commercial party can be 
certified to perform certain activities as a TTP, subject to periodic audits (e.g., often 
security control at airports is performed by commercial companies, and not by the 
national authorities). 
A partial solution for the double invoicing phenomenon (import tax fraud) is the 
Green Corridor between Russia and Finland (also Sweden is involved in this 
agreement). According to this agreement, Finnish companies that are certified by the 
Finnish and Russian customs send pre-arrival information about their exported goods 
to the Finnish customs, who forward this information to the Russian customs. As a 
result, the Russian customs receives pre-arrival information on imported goods, and 
double invoicing can be prevented. The Green Corridor is a typical example of e-
Customs, since one of the core paper evidence documents in the control procedure, 
the invoice, is replaced by the direct exchange of pre-arrival information between the 
Finnish and Russian Customs. We see here the two types of TTPs, both of which are 
the result of implementing principle 3 and can be seen in Figure 3. The Finnish 
customs acts as a TTP for the Russian customs by forwarding pre-arrival information 
(government actors trust each other), and certified Finnish companies act as TTP for 
the Finnish customs by providing the pre-arrival information. Trust in the data sent by 
Finnish companies to the Finnish customs is achieved by means of certification 
(subject to periodic audits). While this solution works for certified companies, it does 
not solve the problem for most companies, because no trusted third party can provide 
evidence of their performance.  
EAGGF also needs to introduce a trusted third party to its business process, to 
provide evidence of the export of agricultural goods outside the EU. EAGGF uses the 
Russian customs as a TTP (again: government actors trust each other). Once import 
duties have been paid in Russia, an import certificate is issued by the Russian customs 
and given to the (Russian) buyer. This certificate is forwarded by the Russian buyer to 
the EU seller who uses it as evidence for its performance (export of agricultural goods 
outside the EU) in the application for EAGGF subsidies. 
Figure 3 shows a new activity diagram, where the two controls have been 
embedded based on Table 3. Broad arrows denote the respective concepts from  
Figure 1 (e.g., business actor, government actor). As there are two procedures 
involved, we differentiate them with different labels. Italic labels with a shadow 
background show the concepts as applied to the Russian import procedure, and bold 
labels with no fill show the concepts as applied to the EAGGF subsidies procedure. 
When this analysis is done using a software tool, the tool can identify situations where 
(e.g., in Figure 2) a control problem exists, and propose possibilities for a TTP, 
indicate the need for producing evidence and which actors may produce this evidence 
(e.g., as in Figure 3).  
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Fig. 3. Redesigned procedure for the export of agricultural goods from Finland to Russia 
Due to the explorative nature of our work, no a-priori knowledge existed of how 
the government procedures should be designed. Therefore, we performed interviews 
with customs experts to assess the reasoning presented in Sections 4.2 and 5, and to 
validate the underlying conceptual model (Figure 1). 
6   Conclusions and Future Work 
Our goal is to develop a methodology for the design of e-Government control 
procedures, using Internet technology to replace paper-based customs documents by 
online information exchange. As such, this paper presents several contributions to 
existing knowledge base. First, we explore similarities and differences between G2B 
and B2B controls. Second, this allows us to define principles for designing G2B 
controls. Third, we present a semi-formal conceptual model that captures this 
knowledge and enables developing decision support tools to support human analysts 
in designing government controls and in analyzing existing controls. 
Traditional research on inter-organizational control focuses on B2B. In this paper 
we argue that existing theory for B2B control can be used as a basis theory for G2B 
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control, when a number of differences between G2B and B2B are taken into 
consideration. The main differences between B2B controls and G2B controls are: (1) 
in B2B relationships we assume no trust in any direction, while in G2B we assume 
that government is trusted by businesses, but not vice versa; and (2) while in B2B 
controls are safeguards for economic value, in the government sector value is broader 
than Return On Investment, and includes societal, legislative and other aspects. 
We take as a starting point B2B control principles as formulated by Bons et al. [7], 
based on acknowledged accounting and auditing theories including [8, 9, 16, 18]. We 
reformulate them to accommodate the differences between B2B and G2B. This results 
in a set of G2B control principles that are grounded in accounting and auditing theory. 
We formalize these G2B control principles in a conceptual model. The main 
advantage of conceptual models is that they can be used as a basis to develop software 
support tools to assist human experts in designing and analyzing organizational 
artifacts. Similar models (applied to other domains) have been implemented in the 
past by Baida [2] and Gordijn & Akkermans [12]. 
A case study about the export of agricultural goods from Finland to Russia was 
used to test and validate our theory. Even though the case study is kept simple for 
demonstration purposes, we show that by applying our principles we can identify 
flaws in government procedures that are used daily, vulnerable to large-scale fraud. 
The reasoning we present in Sections 4.2 (current situation) and 5 (procedure 
redesign) simulates the reasoning that a software support tool would perform, once 
implemented based on our conceptual model. We validated with domain experts 
whether our analysis and its underlying conceptual model are sound and yield the 
desired results. In this way we establish the validity of our principles and model.  
Naturally, one case study is not enough to claim that a theory is valid. Therefore 
we intend to apply this model to other case studies as well, covering a broad scope of 
government controls. We will also seek to extend Table 3 with more control 
principles, and extend our conceptual model to accommodate these additions. For 
example, the case study presented here uses certification as a means to establish trust 
instead of performing control. We will study auditing literature to formulate a 
principle for embedding certifications in our model. 
We distinguish between (1) ICT support in the design and analysis of G2B controls 
and (2) ICT as a means to facilitate government control. In the current paper we 
present a conceptual basis for enabling the former. In [3] we focus on the latter. To 
this end, we are currently engaged in a number of large-scale case studies to study 
how ICT can change the way government controls are carried out in international 
trade, how roles and responsibilities can change and how administrative control can 
replace physical control of goods. 
 
Acknowledgments. This research is part of the integrated project ITAIDE 
(nr.027829), which is funded by the 6th Framework IST programme of the European 
Commission (see www.itaide.org). The authors thank Saara Tveit of the Finnish 
National Board of Customs for useful discussions. 
 Towards a Methodology for Designing E-Government Control Procedures 67 
References 
1. Ahuja, V.: Building Trust in electronic commerce. IT Professional 2(3) (1997) 
2. Baida, Z.: Software-aided Service Bundling – Intelligent Methods & Tools for Graphical 
Service Modeling. PhD thesis. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands (2006) (last 
visited May 25, 2007), available via http://www.baida.nl 
3. Baida, Z., Rukanova, B., Liu, J., Tan, Y.-H.: Rethinking EU Trade Procedures – The Beer 
Living Lab. In: Proceedings of the 20th Bled eCommerce conference, Bled, Slovenia (2007) 
4. Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., Lacy, J.: Decentralized trust management. In: Proceedings of 
The 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 164–173. IEEE Computer 
Society Press, Los Alamitos (1996) 
5. Bons, R.W.H.: Designing Trustworthy Trade Procedures for open Electronic Commerce. 
PhD thesis, University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands (1997) 
6. Bons, R.W.H., Lee, R.M., Wagenaar, R.W.: Designing trustworthy interorganizational 
trade procedures for open electronic commerce. International Journal of Electronic 
Commerce 2(3), 61–83 (1998) 
7. Bons, R.W.H., Lee, R.M., Wagenaar, R.W.: Computer-aided auditing of inter-organi- 
zational trade procedures. International Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting, 
Finance and Management 8(1), 25–44 (1999) 
8. Chen, K.-T., Lee, R.M.: Schematic evaluation of internal accounting control system. 
EURIDIS Research Monograph, Erasmus university Rotterdam (1992) 
9. COSO: Internal control – integrated framework. The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organization of the Treadway Commission (1992) 
10. Dekker, H.C.: Control of inter-organizational relationships: Evidence on appropriation concerns 
and coordination requirements. Accounting, Organization and Society 29(1), 27–49 (2004) 
11. Fowler, M., Scott, K.: UML distilled: Applying the standard object modeling language (1997) 
12. Gordijn, J., Akkermans, J.M.: Designing and evaluating e-Business models. IEEE Intelli- 
gent Systems 16(4), 11–17 (2001) 
13. Liu, J., Baida, Z., Tan, Y.-H., Rukanova, B.: Designing controls for e-government in 
network organizations. In: Schoop, M. (ed.) Proceedings of the 13th Research Symposium 
on Emerging Electronic Markets, Stuttgart, Germany, pp. 22–35 (2006) 
14. Liu, J., Baida, Z., Tan, Y.-H., Korpela, K.: Design and analysis of e-government customs 
control: the Green Corridor between Finland and Russia. In: Proceedings of the 20th Bled 
eCommerce conference, Bled, Slovenia (2007) 
15. Normann, R., Ramirez, R.: Designing interactive strategy: From value chain to value 
constellation. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK (1994) 
16. Romney, M.B., Steinbart, P.J.: Accounting Information Systems, 10th edn. Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs (2006) 
17. Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R.S., Camerer, C.: Not so different after all: A cross-
discipline view of trust. The Academy of Management Review 23(3), 393–404 (1998) 
18. Starreveld, R.W., de Mare, B., Joels, E.: Bestuurlijke Informatieverzorging (in Dutch), 4th 
edn., vol. 1. Samsom, Alphen aan den Rijn (1994) 
19. T3-Group: Trust across disciplines. ISTC (Institute for Cognitive Sciences and 
Technologies). CNR (National Research Council). Italy (2005) 
20. Tapscott, D., Ticoll, D., Lowy, A.: Digital capital – harnessing the power of business 
webs. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts (2000) 
21. WCO (World Customs Organization): Framework for standards to secure and facilitate 
global trade (last visited May 25, 2007), http://www.Wcoomd.Org/ie/en/press/wco%20-
%20framework%20of%20standards%20june%2021%20final.Pdf 
